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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4474  
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002181

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, IO A/S SILVERBERG, AND AF/SPG  
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY  
USUN FOR E BRUNO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [PHUM](#) [PGOV](#) [AU](#) [US](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: RICHARDSON - BASHIR MEETING

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (U) This is an action request ) see para 8.

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President Bashir Agrees to Free Paul Salopek  
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12. (C) At the outset of the 30 minute meeting between Gov. Bill Richardson and President Bashir, Bashir agreed that, as a humanitarian gesture, he would order the release of Chicago Tribune journalist Paul Salopek and his two Chadian colleagues. Bashir said Richardson could travel to Darfur on September 9 to pick up the detainees. Richardson expressed appreciation for Bashir,s humanitarian gesture.

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...and Raises Sudanese Detainees in Guantanamo  
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13. (C) President Bashir then said he wanted to raise, as a humanitarian matter, the continued detention of Sudanese citizens at Guantanamo. He said some had gone to Afghanistan as mujahideen at a time when the USG supported their actions. Now they had been in detention for four years. Once their families learned of Salopek,s release as a humanitarian gesture, they would ask if the USG could reciprocate with a similar action. He asked Richardson to use his good offices to raise this matter with the USG, and Richardson said he would do so.

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President Bashir Sees Agenda in UN PKO  
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14. (C) Richardson asked Bashir if he had anything to say regarding the controversy over peacekeeping in Darfur. Bashir said that with the help of U.S. mediation, a Darfur peace agreement was signed in early May. He had expected the international community to focus then on implementation of the DPA, supporting the signatories and putting pressure on those who had rejected the DPA. Instead, the U.S. only focus for follow-up was to insist that the African Union,s role end and the UN take over. This action had nothing to do with peace; it was a new agenda.

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Bashir: Press for DPA Support; UN Approach Trusteeship  
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15. (C) Bashir said that some field commanders from the non-signatory parties initially shifted to support the DPA, but the failure of the international community to pressure rejectionist or to condemn their attacks was wrong. Now a

rejectionist front had formed, and no one condemned their attacks. Considering this background, Bashir thought the UN approach was to put Sudan under trusteeship, exerting police and judicial authority throughout Sudan. Many people in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan see the UN as the enemy.

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Bashir: UNSC Ignores Sudan's Plan for Darfur Security  
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¶6. (C) Bashir recalled that at the July AU Summit he agreed with UN Secretary General Annan that Sudan would prepare a plan to re-establish peace and security in Darfur over six months and to submit it to Annan. Bashir had this, but the UNSC Resolution ignored Sudan's plan and the need to fund AU peacekeepers. The UN's plan was a new colonial scheme. So, he rejected a UN role, despite outside pressure. His own plan was the last alternative available.

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Richardson: Sudan Should Discuss UNSCR Implementation  
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¶7. (C) Richardson suggested that Bashir engage in discussions with the UN on what troops might be in a UN force and on how UN SCR 1706 might be implemented. Bashir said he had studied the issue carefully and made up his mind.

¶8. (C) ACTION REQUESTED: Post would appreciate updated information on Sudanese detainees in Guantanamo. Foreign Minister Lam Akol may raise this issue in any upcoming meetings with senior USG officials.  
POWERS